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Abstract
This research project has produced an innovative
architecture and corrresponding engineering prototype
consisting of trusted security services and integrated
operating system mechanisms for the protection of
distributed multi-domain computing environments from
malicious code and other attacks. These security services
and mechanisms extend and interoperate with existing
workstations, applications and open source operating
systems, providing new capabilities for composing secure
distributed systems using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
components. The latter construct results from the
realization that unless a secure system offers users
comfortable and familiar interfaces for handling routine
information, the secure system will fail due to lack of user
acceptability. This work was supported in part by the
MYSEA project of the DARPA/ATO CHATS program.
1. Introduction
The purpose of the Monterey Security Enhanced
Architecture (MYSEA, pronounced, my-SEE-ah) project
is to provide a trusted distributed operating environment
for enforcing multi-domain security policies, which
supports unmodified COTS productivity applications.  The
architecture encompasses a combination of many low-
assurance commercial components and relatively few
specialized (e.g., high-assurance) multi-domain
components. This arrangement permits the ongoing DoD
and U.S. Government investment in commodity personal
computer (PC) operating systems and applications to be
integrated into an environment where enforcement of
critical security policies is assigned to more trusted
elements.  Assurance is derived from the application of
high assurance system design and development methods to
the trusted elements as well as to the overall architecture.
The trusted computing base (TCB) for MYSEA is
called the Monterey Secure Architecture Operating System
(MYSEOS, pronounced, my-SEE-ose).  In the MYSEA
prototype we have constructed, MYSEOS is based upon a
security-enhanced version of the OpenBSD operating
system. We selected OpenBSD as the basis because the
secure code reviews utilized by OpenBSD [11] provide a
level of confidence in correct implementation that is not
available in other open source operating systems.
However, the operating system modifications we have
defined are modular and conceptually simple enough that
they could be accomplished on a variety of open source
platforms (e.g., Linux). While the architecture can support
higher assurance TCB components, the use of unevaluated
and possibly unevaluatable operating systems in this
research demonstration prototype could not be expected to
achieve the assurance required for the secure management
of information having a range of sensitivity levels [10].
We provide a mechanism for vertical integration of
application security requirements with underlying security
services, applying an existing Quality of Security Service
model and framework [7] to the integrated security
structure. Additionally, the MYSEA system supports a
secure unforgeable bidirectional connection, called a
trusted path, between the user and the trusted elements of
the system.
Several aspects of this research provide innovative
advances in the state of the art for protecting multiple
domains of information and for the management of
security policies and security services in support of critical
applications (for a discussion of related work, see [8]).
Ultimately, the commercial proliferation of these
innovations will be available for direct consumption by the
DoD for use by operational forces as well as for critical
national information infrastructure systems. Specific
innovations that are suitable for immediate technical
transfer to commercial products are:
ß A distributed architecture for isolating trusted
components in support of commercial and open
source applications.  The innovative use of add-
on components in commercial client-server
systems can potentially magnify the impact of
trusted open source systems.
ß An open source trusted path mechanism for
assured and unambiguous user communication
with the trusted computing base.
ß Techniques for vertical integration of security
policy control functions with underlying security
services in a Quality of Security Service
framework.
ß Single sign-on for access to a community of
distributed multi-domain policy servers.  Once a
user has authenticated to MYSEOS, application
sessions may be transferred to any confederated
MYSEA Server.
2. Monterey Security Enhanced Architecture
(MYSEA)
MYSEA is a distributed client-server architecture
featuring a combination of (relatively few) specialized
policy enforcing components and multiple open source and
commercial off-the-shelf components.  The major physical
components of the architecture are illustrated in Figure 1:
ß Security enhanced servers which provide the
locus for security policy enforcement and host
various open source or commercial application
protocol servers, and
ß Security enhanced workstations that consist of
commercial-class PCs executing popular
commercial software products, along with
Trusted Path Extensions that provide trustworthy
policy support mechanisms and thus permit
server-enforced security policy to be distributed
across the network.
Figure 1. Monterey Security Enhanced
Architecture (MYSEA)
The MYSEA Server enforces the security policy and
controls access to information. At its heart is a security-
enhanced version of the OpenBSD operating system
(MYSEOS). Application protocol servers run on the
trusted server and provide services and interfaces to shared
resources. When MYSEOS is combined with untrusted,
but policy constrained (and, in some instances, policy
aware) application protocol servers, the result is the
MYSEA Server. Each MYSEA workstation is a PC
equipped with a Trusted Path Extension device that
provides MYSEA policy support at the workstation. The
MYSEA Server(s) and the Trusted Path Extension(s) are
the only components directly connected to the physical
network. Multiple MYSEA Servers provide scalability
within the desired security policy perimeter.
2.1 MYSEA concept of operation
Using the Trusted Path Extension at the PC, users log
on to the MYSEA system by way of a trusted path,
establishing an identity for audit and access control
purposes, and then establish session properties such as
current sensitivity level.  Subsequently, the user can log on
to the native client OS at the PC and use standard
commercial client software (e.g., web browser or e-mail
program) to access applications supported by the MYSEA
Server, or use any applications supported by the local PC.
From the PC the user can access any domain of server data
allowed by the security policy (for example, reading
domains of data that are lower in sensitivity that the
negotiated session level) as well as access local data. By
again invoking the trusted path, the user can request to
modify session security attributes, such as "session level.”
During such negotiations, the Trusted Path Extension will
ensure that client access to the network is blocked.
2.2 MYSEA components
The MYSEA system consists of the following hierarchy
of components, which are described below.
ß MYSEA Server
o Policy-aware application protocol
servers
o MYSEOS
ß Trusted path services
ß Security Support Services
ß Secure session services
ß Quality of security services
ß Cryptographic services
ß Multi-domain open source
k e r n e l  ( M L S - e n h a n c e d
OpenBSD)
ß MYSEA Workstation
o Trusted Path Extension






Each MYSEA Server consists of MYSEOS, which
enforces critical security policy, and assorted untrusted
application server instances (e.g. one per security domain
per user).  The actions of the application servers are
constrained by the policy enforcement mechanisms of
MYSEOS. The application servers are functionally
equivalent in terms of overall application-level protocol
support to a COTS application server for the particular
protocol provided. Thus, each application server is
compatible with existing COTS client packages.
Additionally, information managed by application servers
can be organized to support such sharing as is allowed by
the server, as well as advisory labeling.
2.4 MYSEOS
MYSEOS (depicted in Figure 2) is built on OpenBSD
as a set of kernel enhancements to create labeled protection
domains and a set of additional security services. The
MYSEOS kernel associates security attributes with active
and passive entities exported at the operating system
interface. Enhancements include a protected security
manager configured to interpret these attributes and
enforce policy according to configuration-specific rules.
An important policy for the MYSEOS kernel to enforce is
that malicious code may neither exfiltrate confidentially-
sensitive data nor corrupt information of higher integrity;
to support this, the MYSEOS kernel provides multi-
domain file system support, which provides for the global
and persistent separation of data into its respective
domains. Other security services that have been integrated
into the MYSEOS kernel are described below.
Figure 2. MYSEA server
2.5 Trusted path services
The Trusted Path Services component supports multiple
locally attached terminals, as well as multiple remote
MYSEA workstations. Trusted Path Services maintains the
state of the user-to-MYSEA interaction, for example, a
user may be logged in with default security attributes, but
may not have started a session executing untrusted
application code. Trusted Path Services provides an
interface to the Security Support Services component to
support identification and authentication, negotiation of
domain or domain range, password modification, account
creation and deletion, and user security attribute
maintenance. Once a session has been established, the
Trusted Path Services provides a distributed Session Status
Database to the Secure Session Services component.
2.6 Secure session services
The Secure Session Services component is used to
launch instances of untrusted constrained application
protocol servers. It provides trusted policy-sensitive
services, with functionality similar to that of classic inetd
implementations and supports standard application
protocol transmissions. The Secure Session Services
accesses the Session Status Database, maintained by the
Trusted Path component, to determine the security
attributes to associate with each application protocol
server.
This Session Status Database contains tuples that
uniquely identify the user, the client workstation
associated with the user, the status of the user session, the
security attributes of the session, and other security
relevant information. Through a session status
communication mechanism, information in the Session
Status Database can be provided to distributed multi-policy
platforms, thus providing a single sign-on and session level
capability.
2.7 Quality of Security Service support
MYSEA can be integrated with an external resource or
QoS manager to provide a means of dynamically
managing its security and performance characteristics. The
MYSEA QoSS Manager is the external QoSS interface to
MYSEA, and governs security and performance factors of
the various MYSEA components, for example, which
application protocol servers the client may interact with,
and the cryptographic protection characteristics of the
underlying communication channels. The QoSS security
and connectivity database is managed by the QoSS
manager on the MYSEA server, and is distributed to the
Trusted Path Extensions, as needed.
The Quality of Security Service manager provides a
user interface so that decision makers can request the
overall security posture of the network. This interface
provides the decision maker with a simple set of choices,
hiding the underlying complexity of the quality of security
service mechanisms [9].
2.8 Constrained application protocol servers
The secure session server provides instances of standard
protocol servers for each client or for equivalence classes
of clients. The Session Status Database, which is managed
by the trusted path services component, but is readable by
the secure session server, is used to assign security
attributes to protocol servers launched on behalf of a
requesting client. Thus, the protocol servers are associated
with domains reflecting the granularity of the policy
enforced by the underlying trusted operating system.
Protocol servers take two forms. The first form is a
standard, policy-unaware protocol server, e.g. HTTP.
These servers are restricted to accessing files and other
objects associated only with the particular domain
associated with the session. The second type of server is
policy-aware, e.g., a file system [6], and is able to take
advantage of certain security policy domain relations that
permit limited modes of access to certain other domains
(e.g., "read down" for mandatory confidentiality policies).
Among the application servers we have adapted to the
MYSEA environment are: Internet Mail Access Protocol
(IMAP) based on the University of Washington IMAP
server [4], Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) based on
the Apache server [1], and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP) based upon sendmail [3]. Each server required
little or no code modification to be adapted to the
multilevel environment. With a proper configuration of the
policy-aware application protocol server, users can view
information at or below their current session levels.
2.9 MYSEA workstations
MYSEA workstations consist of two physical
components:  a Trusted Path Extension and an untrusted
personal computer (see Figure 3).  The PCs are typical
COTS products hosting a popular commercial operating
system and a commercial application suite. The application
suite contains client software intended to access standard
application protocol servers. For example, mail service
clients might include: Lotus Notes, Outlook, Pine, Postal,
and Netscape [5]. A typical browser supports the client
interface to web pages.
Figure 3. MYSEA Workstation
To ensure that object reuse requirements are met,
workstations are managed to be, in effect, "diskless," with
sufficient volatile RAM-disk capability to support a wide
variety of user applications. The Trusted Path Extension
satisfies object reuse requirements by ensuring that RAM
and other volatile primary and secondary storage are
purged with each change of session level or new user login
at the workstation.
2.10 Trusted path extension
The trusted elements of the MYSEA system provide the
locus of security policy enforcement. Not only do these
elements provide runtime policy enforcement, but they
must also provide services for the enforcement of
supporting policies. To create a distributed TCB, the
architecture includes a Trusted Path Extension at each
workstation.
The Trusted Path Extension maintains its own self-
protecting domain that is separate from the user and
workstation domains. The use of a separate processor for
the Trusted Path Extension ensures that it cannot be
subverted by malicious software on the workstation.
Architecturally, the Trusted Path Extension provides the
PC’s only access to the network.
The Trusted Path Extension has two form factors: an
internal PCI card (planned for future development) and an
external hand-held computer (per the current MYSEA
prototype).  In the PCI card format the Trusted Path
Extension presents a NIC interface to the workstation.
User trusted path I/O, including the secure attention key, is
achieved via strictly controlled access to the PC keyboard
and display.  In the handheld format, the Trusted Path
Extension performs IP network address translation for all
IP traffic going between the PC and the LAN -- and user
trusted path I/O occurs via the handheld’s native keyboard
and screen.
Simplicity has been a primary design goal for the
Trusted Path Extension. The objective was not to construct
a second operating system for the PC; it does not require
the complexity and rich set of services provided by a
typical PC (e.g. file system, printers and other peripheral
drivers). The Trusted Path Extension can be viewed as a
minimized embedded system that maintains no state of its
own; instead, it functions as a “drone” in response to
commands from the MYSEA server for controlling the
workstation and managing I/O with the user.   The Trusted
Path Extension, under direction from the MYSEA server,
supports the following services:
ß Secure Attention Key – this service permits users
to initiate unambiguous communication with
MYSEOS for unspoofable presentation and
capture of security critical data at the user
interface. The secure attention key must cause a
state change in the Trusted Path Extension such
that an unforgeable communications path (viz. a
trusted path) to MYSEOS is established.
ß Trusted Path Services – when the trusted path is
invoked, the user may elect to input security
critical information, such as a password. The
trusted path services ensure that prompts from the
server are displayed and that an input mechanism
for replies is available.
ß Controlled LAN Access – provide non-
bypassable, controlled access to the LAN from
the PC. Malicious software on the PC cannot
bypass the Trusted Path.
ß Communications and cryptographic services –
provide protected communication channels
between the server and the Trusted Path
Extension. These protected communications are
based upon protocols that support both the
establishment and maintenance of a trusted path
and session-level communications, such as to
initiate communication with the server (via the
secure attention key), as well as to receive and to
respond to commands from the MYSEA Server.
ß Negotiated Session Services – these mechanisms
ensure trusted object reuse at the client PC for
both primary and secondary storage. When a user
chooses to change domains, certain policies
require that information associated with the
previous domain be purged from the untrusted
PC, e.g. previous session information cannot be
reused by subsequent sessions in conflict with the
distributed security policy.  The Trusted Path
Extension ensures that object reuse requirements
are met with each session change and as dictated
by policy for session level changes. The Trusted
Path Extension supports object reuse directives
issued by MYSEOS. These directives may
include both functional and procedural actions at
the workstation.
ß Control of Security Critical Activities –control
the client and its resources at the time of boot and
control security critical actions throughout the
client session.
ß Quality of Security Service - as networks become
more complex and adaptive, it may be necessary
to provide "security on demand."  When
conditions on the network change, requirements
for security may also change. In response to a
change notification, quality of security service
mechanisms located on the Trusted Path
Extension can modify the protection services
afforded an ongoing session.  The selection of
protection mechanisms for communications
between the client and the server may be based
upon network conditions such as INFOCON
mode. A version of IPSec adapted to provide
automated, dynamic Quality of Security Service
through the use of an enhanced version of a
policy server such as Keynote [2] permits
selection of protection mechanisms for MYSEA
Servers.
3. Conclusion
We have presented the Monterey Security Enhanced
Architecture (MYSEA), which provides a trusted
distributed operating environment for enforcing multi-
domain security policies, and which supports unmodified
COTS productivity applications.  The architecture
encompasses a combination of many (untrusted)
commercial components and relatively few trusted multi-
domain components. Our prototype implementation
utilizes a security-enhanced version of the OpenBSD
operating system, called MYSEOS, as the policy enforcing
trusted computing base (TCB).  The architecture is general
enough that it would easily accommodate a high assurance
TCB, as well.
MYSEA introduces several innovations for protecting
multiple data domains and for managing security policies
and security services in support of critical applications,
including:
ß A distributed trusted architecture that utilizes
commercial and open source applications to
access multiple data domains.
ß An open source trusted path mechanism.
ß Techniques for vertical integration of security
policy control functions with underlying security
services.
ß Single sign-on for access to a community of
distributed multi-domain policy servers.
In the future, we plan several additions and
enhancements to MYSEA.  We have begun investigation
of a ring mechanism [12] for open source operating
systems, to help constrain the behavior of applications that
run on MYSEOS and similar environments.
There are various systems and tools available to support
the automated verification of computer system behavior.
As a precursor to the formal analysis of the security
behavior of MYSEA components, we have received
support to perform a survey of available formal
verification tools. That survey was started this summer.
We have recently started a project that includes the
development of a very high assurance micro kernel.  The
goal for the Trusted Computing Exemplar Project is to
provide a worked example of a high assurance system that
can be used by the education community, government and
industry. To further that aim, we plan to make the micro
kernel, its development methodology and its evaluation
evidence generally available through open source methods.
As an early example of the application of the high
assurance micro kernel, we plan to implement a high
assurance Trusted Path Extension.
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